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I. INTRODUCTION

On June 27, 1986, the International Court of Justice' declared in
the Military Activities Case' that the United States, though absent
from the proceedings, had violated customary international law
with respect to aggression against Nicaragua and also had violated
the "object and purpose" of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation of January 21, 19568 between the two states.4
* Professor of International Law, Department of Defense, National Defense University, Washington D.C. The comments and views set forth in this paper are the personal
opinions of the author.
1. The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and its predecessor court,
the Permanent Court of International Justice, can be found in the following sources and the
materials they cite: S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
(1965); 1. SHIHATA. THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN
JURISDICTION (1965); Waldock, Decline of the Optional Clause, 1955 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
278-79; R. ANAND, COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
(1961); 12 M. WHITEMAN. DIGEST INT'L L. (rev. ed. 1971); WORLD AFFAIRS (Summer
1985); Nicaragua vs. the United States Before the International Court of Justice (Guest
Editor: Allan Gerson)-particularly the articles by Myres S. McDougal, Bruce Rashkow,
Fred L. Morrison and Harry H. Almond, Jr. For reference on political disputes, see C. DE
VISSCHER. THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Corbett trans. rev. ed.
1968). As to the use of force and aggression, see M. MCDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961). For information on the P.C.I.J., see M. HUDSON,
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942 (1943); L. GROSS, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1958); G.

(1976); D.

SCHWARZENBERGER,

BOWETT, SELF DEFENSE IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY

INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1957-1976). See also the standard case books
BISHOP, GREEN, BRIGGS & SOHN, WORLD LAW AND UNITED NATIONS LAW; J. SWEENEY, C.
OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1981). The opinion of the

Court in the Nicaraguan Case and of three dissenting judges, Schwebel, Jennings and Oda,
also provide valuable sources. The works of Professor Myres S. McDougal and his associates
in particular must be singled out for their importance in establishing this inquiry. The element of power in international relations can be reviewed in N. SPYKMAN, AMERICA'S STRATEGY IN WORLD POLITICS (THE UNITED STATES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER) (1942). See

also Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 43 (1986) and the materials cited there; J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1959); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES (1963).
2. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 [hereinafter Military Activities Case], also known as the NicaraguanMining
Case.
3. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and Protocol, Jan. 21, 1956,

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

1

1987]

THE NICARAGUAN
MILITARY
California Western
International
LawACTIVITIES
Journal, Vol.
17, No. 1 [], Art. 7
CASE

While the full impact of this decision on the future of the Court
cannot be assessed at this time, a preliminary appraisal of its strategic implications can be made.
The Military Activities Case was commenced on April 9, 1985,
when Nicaragua filed an application with the Court5 to begin proceedings against the United States with respect to alleged military
and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua.' On May 10,
1984, the Court ordered as provisional measures that the United
States cease the restriction of access to Nicaraguan ports, refrain
from the laying of mines in Nicaraguan waters, cease activities infringing on the sovereignty and independence of Nicaragua through
the use of force and join with Nicaragua in ensuring that no action
would be taken to prejudice the rights of the other in carrying out
the decision of the Court.
In its determinations regarding jurisdiction over the matter, the
Court declared in its judgment dated November 26, 1985, that it
had jurisdiction under customary international law both with respect to the parties and the subject matter of the case pursuant to
United States-Nicaragua, entered into force May 24, 1958, notice of terminationgiven by
United States May 1, 1985, effective May 1, 1986, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024, 367
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Treaty of 1956].
4. In its opinion, the Court observed that Nicaragua had claimed, inter alia, that the
actions of the United States were such as to defeat the "object and purpose" of the Treaty of
1956. Military Activities Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 22. The Court in fact found breaches of obligations assumed by the United States under Article XIX of the treaty. Id. at 147-48. Article
XIX was raised by Nicaragua and noted by the Court in its judgment of 26 November 1984
on jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of the application, printed in XXIV I.L.M. 59
(1985). The Court noted that Article XIX provides that
"Between the territories of the two Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and
navigation" (para. I) and continues "3. Vessels of either Party shall have liberty, on
equal terms with vessels of the other Party ....
to come with their cargoes to all
ports, places and waters of such other Party open to foreign commerce and navigations . . [sic]
Military Activities Case, 1986 I.C.J at 140 (quoting arts. XIX(I) and (3) of Treaty of 1956,
supra note 3).
Apart from its vagueness, the term "object and purpose" lends itself to subjective assessments. For example, in Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/C 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M 679 (1969), the same term is
used with respect to obligations of states that have signed treaties and with respect to reservations. In his dissent, however, Judge Schwebel found Article XXI (1)(d) of the Treaty of
1956 controlling. This Article provides that "[t]he present Treaty shall not preclude the
application of measures: . . . necessary to fulfill the obligations of a party for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential
security interests ....
5. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, annexed to the Charter
of the United Nations. All members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the
statute by virtue of Article 93 of the United Nations Charter, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
6. See Reflections of the State Department on the U.S. and World Court, WORLD
AFFAIRS 53 (1985). See also memorials of the parties and accompanying documents filed in
the jurisdictional phase of the case.
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Articles 36(2) and (5) of the Statute of the Court. Further, the
7
Court announced that it had jurisdiction under the Treaty of 1956.
In its letter dated January 18, 1985, the United States withdrew
from the Court, observing that the Court had no jurisdiction and
that the judgment "was clearly and manifestly erroneous as to both
fact and law." 8
In reaching its decision on the merits of the case, the Court relied on submissions of Nicaragua, on testimony of witnesses called
by Nicaragua and on data and information from public sources,
including the news media and public documents of the United
States government. In a long dissent, Judge Schwebel rejected the
Court's findings in their entirety except for a violation that he
found inherent in the failure of the United States to notify mariners
about the blockade. Dissents were also filed by Judges Oda and
Jennings.
II.

HOLDINGS

The Court held generally that its jurisdiction was not established
under the United States declaration of August 26, 1946, by which
it submitted to the Court's jurisdiction. The reason for this finding
was that the U.S. declaration contained a reservation with respect
to multilateral treaties, including the United Nations Charter,
which stated that its submittal to jurisdiction would depend on all
parties to the treaty appearing. Instead, jurisdiction was based on
customary international law with respect to aggression and the
Treaty of 1956.
As to the material issues, the Court held that
-the actions of the United States were not justifiable under its
rights of self-defense or collective self-defense;
-the actions taken by the United States in support of contra
forces constituted a breach of customary international law with
respect to obligations not to intervene in the affairs of another
state;
-actions by the United States, including the mining of waters
and overflights of Nicaragua, during the first months of 1984
breached customary international law not to use force, breached
Nicaraguan sovereignty and were contrary to obligations relating
to peaceful maritime commerce;
-the dissemination of a CIA manual on guerrilla warfare
7.
8.

Military Activities Case, 1986
Id.
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amounted to the promotion of acts "contrary to the general principles of humanitarian law," but this dissemination was not imputable to the United States;
-embargoes by the United States declared on May 1, 1985, as to
trade with Nicaragua and the forcible actions mentioned above
were in breach of the Treaty of 1956; and
-the
United States was to terminate all violations and was
obliged to make reparation to Nicaragua for the breaches of customary international law and for the breaches of the Treaty of
1956, with the "form and amount of such reparation, failing
agreement between the Parties, [to] be settled by the Court...
III.

ISSUES AND ASSUMPTIONS

The legal issues in the case appeared to be:
Whether the use of force in on-going hostilities is an issue justiciable by the Court and whether the Court in seeking to resolve this
issue is resolving a "legal dispute" pursuant to its mandate under
Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court; and whether the Court
is the proper organ to address and regulate when and under what
conditions the use of force among states during on-going hostilities is impermissible.
A.

Legal Dispute-Justiciability

Jurisdiction of the Court in cases such as the Military Activities
Case is limited by Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court to those
"legal disputes" which raise issues of international law. The meaning of "legal disputes," however, is ambiguous; clarification comes
through judicial opinions. As Charles de Visscher, a noted Euro-

pean authority, observed,
[i]t was in the attempts, vain as they were, to classify international disputes according to their justiciability that the political

criterion was for a long time most carefully studied. Before the
war of 1914-1918, international law doctrine, close enough on this
point to international treaties, was agreed in regarding disputes of
major importance as not arbitrable or justiciable. The authors
who had gone most deeply into the difficulty found precise expression for their thought in the observation that this class must in-

clude all those disputes whose settlement "might seriously affect
the future possibilities of State power." 10
9. See id.at 14.
10.

C. DE VISSCHER. THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

75 (Cor-

bett trans. 1957) (footnotes omitted).
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Under current practice, some disputes are distinguished on the
basis of being "political" disputes;11 that is, disputes that need to be
resolved among states through negotiation or through processes
other than those of judicial tribunals.1" As Judge Oda indicated,
one approach has been to sever those disputes that involve the "vital" interests of states, that is, in current terminology, the security
and defense interests, because these are issues states have always
reserved to themselves.
While the opinions and decision process of the United States Supreme Court can bear at best only superficial similarities to the
World Court, the discussion in Baker v. Carr" concerning the "political question" somewhat clarifies the problem that an international tribunal faces in seeking to control the issues before it. Under
the United Nations Charter, both the "political" question issue,
that is, the "separation of powers" among competing decision-making organs, and the managerial issue, that is, the judicial control
over the issues, come together. The observations of Justice Brennan
in Baker are relevant to this merger:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments
4
on one question.1
While stressing again that the World Court is not operating in
the same policy arena as the United States Supreme Court, a common concern is apparent: Which is the appropriate organ to decide
I!. States usually manage the "political dispute" issue by reservations in their submittals to the jurisdiction of the Court or by the withholding of their appearances where the
jurisdiction is to be based on state consent. See Military Activities Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 23646 (Oda, J., dissenting), concerning the question of "non liquet," noting that issues may be
resolved by transfer to another decision process.
12. As de Visscher added, "[t]he notion of the political covers in international relations realities as yet uncontrolled not only by law but even by reason; its fluid and capricious
character defies all attempts at classification." C. DE VISSCHER, supra note 10, at 77.
13. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
14. Id. at 217.
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on matters of aggression? It is evident from the practice of states
that, without exception, issues that might involve the use of force,
the conduct of hostilities, the use of weapons and combat and warfare in general have been withheld from the court.15
The only case that appears to have involved such matters, and
then only peripherally, was the Corfu Channel Case.16 But in that
case, the hostile situation had abated. Moreover, the case had
strong peacetime elements: The United Kingdom was contesting
the actions of a coastal state which had forcibly closed transit to an
adjacent international channel during peacetime. Without an extended examination into standards, policies and facts relating to the
use of force, the Court was able to hold favorably for the United
Kingdom to forcibly assert its own rights to transit. In sum, the
Court recognized the right asserted by the United Kingdom and its
claim to resort to force, if necessary.
There is a marked difference between a case such as that involving the Corfu Channel, where the rights of states to defend themselves if forcibly opposed in passing through international straits
are at issue, and the Military Activities Case, where aggression is
to be appraised in the context of continuing hostilities. The practice
of states with regard to aggression demonstrates a widely shared
perception that this is a global order issue. It resembles both the
domestic legislative process and the development of constitutional
law. An interesting comparison can also be made between the
United States Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice with respect to the purpose of each institution and the corresponding avenues of application and interpretation of law. The
United States Supreme Court, unlike the International Court of
Justice, was and is expected to work out constitutional issues in an
established public order, not to shape the emergence of a global
public order through the efforts of nation states. While the Supreme Court can rely on a long tradition of common law and English legal and constitutional precedents, the International Court
15.

See 12 M.

WHITEMAN,

supra note 1,at 1191, where the Legal Advisor to the

Department of State observed that the Security Council cannot compel states to go to Court;
it can only recommend that they do so.
16. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4. The Namibia Case (Advisory
Opinion on the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia South West Africa), 1971
I.C.J. 16, is also inapplicable because the Security Council requested an advisory opinion and
recommended that the parties resolve the issues in court. The question put by the Security
Council makes this clear: "What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?"
1971 l.C.J. at 17; see generally supra note i.
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must adjudicate opposing claims and policies of nation states forming their own objectives with regard to the resulting public order.
Aggression, as such, has not been raised in either the advisory or

contentious proceedings in the present Court or its predecessor.
But, it has been the subject of lengthy efforts aimed at arriving at a
definition, commencing with proposals from the Soviet Union in
1933.17 The concept has been introduced into non-aggression treaties adopted between the wars. It appears in the Helsinki Accords' 8
and in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concern-

ing Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 9 and was defined in
the Resolution of the General Assembly on the Definition of
20
Aggression.
In establishing the United Nations, states realized that aggression was a matter that needed both to be "defined" through future
practice and then limited. Article 2(4), providing for limitations
undertaken directly by the member states, was balanced through
preserving the right of states to self-defense and collective self-defense set forth in Article 51. 1
The Charter is not, however, the constitutive instrument of a
firmly established global order with authority and competence entrusted to its decision-making orders.2 2 Nevertheless, there are ele17. For a note on the Soviet proposal on aggression and for further developments, see
W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 923-26 (3d ed. 1971). The Soviet proposal was in the
context of the League of Nations actions and is notable for making all acts of aggression
turn on the party that first commits the prohibited acts.
18. Final of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("Helsinki Accords"), Aug. 1, 1975, Dep't State Pub. No. 8826, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1929 (1975).
19. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/
8028 (1971).
20. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1975).
21. For an extensive review of the legality of United States intervention in Vietnam,
see the memorandum of the Legal Advisor of the Department of State and the independent
lawyers' memorandum in 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 1, at 121.
22. See McDougal, International Law and the Future, 50 Miss. L.J. 259, 310 (1980)
(footnote omitted):
The number one problem of humankind remains ... that of security in the sense of
establishing a minimum order, in control of unauthorized coercion and violence,
which will permit more effective pursuit of an optimum order in maximization of
the shaping and sharing of all values. Through articles 2(4) and 51 of the United
Nations Charter, and many ancillary prescriptions, the global community has at
long last achieved a workable distinction between impermissible and permissible coercion, admitting of application in particular instances in support of minimum order. It remains, however, for the community to establish an appropriate institutional
framework both for disinterested, third-party appraisal of particular instances of
alleged impermissible coercion and for the application of appropriate sanctioning
measures in preventing and deterring coercion and in restoring and rehabilitating
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ments of "separation of powers" and those elements make the observations in Baker v. Carr relevant to appraising the Court's role
in global affairs. Article 24 vests the Security Council with the
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security." 23 In the same article, the members of the United
Nations "agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."
In the United Nations practice, the "primary responsibility" has
become the "exclusive responsibility" in large measure because the
General Assembly has only recommendatory powers. The Resolution on the Definition of Aggression reflects both the limited powers
of the General Assembly and the exclusive powers of the Security
Council. Even the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution2 4 could only consider the matter with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures.25 But, the Charter provides in Article 25 that members "agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council." No such provision in the Charter establishes comparable decisional authority in the General
Assembly."
Moreover, the overall context of the Charter is aimed at seeking
effective control over the use of force and over aggression in particular. The primary objectives of the Charter include the establishment of security among states, that is the "maintenance of international peace and security," and the promotion of human rights.
These appear in the Preamble, in the articles on "purposes and
principles" set forth in Chapter I and throughout the Charter. All
of the organs have a role with respect to such matters, but the decisional role is limited to the Security Council.
Chapter IV, concerning specific settlement of disputes, and
Chapter VII, concerning action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, provide the major
public order. Though contemporary nation-states receive tremendous benefits from
constitutive process, they have as yet been only imperfectly subjected to its complementary burdens.
23. U.N. CHARTER, art. 24 1.
24. "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, Nov. 3, 1950, G.A. Res. 377A(V), 5 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1951).
25. For a valuable follow-up to the expectations of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution,
see the reports of the Collective Measures Committee established by the General Assembly
in 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 1,at 342-49. See also the identification of arms, ammunition and the implements of war that might be included in an embargo, id. at 349.
26. The framework of Security Council authority under the United Nations Charter,
Chapter VI for peacekeeping, appears in 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 1, at 894-1152; for
the International Court of Justice, see id. at 1153-1471.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol17/iss1/7

8

CALIFORNIAMilitary
WESTERN
INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL
Almond: The Nicaraguan
Activities
Case (Nicaragua
v. United Stat[Vol. 17

framework in which aggression is to be managed. Under Article 39,
the Security Council has far-reaching and singular authority to
make determinations about threats and aggression, to make recommendations and decisions as to measures to be taken by way of
preventing, deterring or countering aggression and to formulate the
strategies for restoring peace and security. In these powers, the Security Council has authority readily identified with law: It determines and interprets the applicable law or standards to be applied,
it invokes that law or standard and it applies or enforces that law
or standard.
Objection may be raised that even though these are conceded as
the exclusive powers and authority of the Security Council, the
Court can and should isolate those issues that amount to a "legal
dispute" and "resolve" them. But here, the difficulty is simply that
of function: The Court cannot be expected to take hold and manage
the actions and policies of the states as such. It attempted to do so
in the Military Activities Case, but this is unrealistic under the
best of conditions. The Court, in the aggression cases, cannot satisfy its mandate of handing down decisions with "finality." As
Judge Schwebel indicated, the facts in the Military Activities Case
would be similar to probably any case of continuing hostilities or
continuing threats of aggression. The process of isolating instances
of illegal uses of force where force is traded off between the parties
is meaningless. 27 Worse still, again as Judge Schwebel noted, the
facts clearly reveal that Nicaragua was the aggressor and came
into court with "unclean hands."
Objection is frequently made that the Security Council has been
immobilized through the veto. But without the veto, the United Nations would never have been instituted. The veto reflects, both operationally and symbolically, that the contentions between states with
sharply opposing and competing claims on the future of global order are not easily "solved." But even when the veto is exercised to
prevent the Security Council from dealing with specific claims of
aggression, the practice of states since the Second World War
shows that other forces continue to apply to moderate or confine the
conflict. The outbreaks of such violence compel states to recognize
27. See Military Activities Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 320-31 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) on
the fact finding; id. at 331-53 on El Salvador's rights of self defense; id. at 353-62 as to the
United States rights in collective self-defense with El Salvador; id. at 362-69 on necessity
and proportionality (not discussed in the present paper); and id. at 369-73 on collective selfdefense extended to measures taken in Nicaragua.
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that they must move to share expectations and commonalities about
public order and provide procedures and processes for the appropriate institutions to give such order effectiveness in terms of minimum security.
The authority of the Court is limited in several ways. First, it is a
"judicial" organ and its role in the maintenance of international
peace and security must therefore be determined by the limits necessarily imposed on the adjudicatory process while a public order is
being shaped by states themselves. Further limitations appear in
the nature of the Court's decision:
First, the ruling lacks binding force except between the parties
and for the particular case; the judgment is final and without appeal; and limited authority is established for revision, subject, however, to discovery of new facts that would be a decisive factor in the
decision but which were unknown when the decision was handed
down."
Second, the Court has no enforcement powers. Pursuant to Article 94 of the Charter, a party may have recourse to the Security
Council for recommendations or decisions for measures to give effect to the judgment if the opposing party fails to perform under
the judgment. But the Security Council, the veto aside, need act
only in its own discretion.
Third, the Court has limited jurisdiction over the member
30
states29 and only forty-six states are subject to its jurisdiction.
None of the communist states except Cambodia have submitted
and Israel notified the court of termination of its submittal effective
November 21, 1986.
Whatever might have been the global expectations concerning
the authority and control relating to the decisions of the Court
when it was founded at the end of the Second World War, state
practice since that war, and even under the predecessor Permanent
Court of International Justice, indicates that states now anticipate
that "legal disputes" will be limited to those disputes in which
neither their major interests nor the means for promoting or achieving those interests are among the legal issues to be decided. Perhaps this is a reflection that states recognize that the development
28. See Statute of the Internatinal Court of Justice, supra note 4, art. 61.
29. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
30. On the states that have submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, see Treaties in Force, U.S. Dep't State Pub. 9433 (Jan. 1986). Almost all of the 46
states have attached conditions or "reservations."
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of their law is shaped through a process of claims and counterclaims toward reciprocal tolerances and "certain uniformalities of
pattern," flowing out of a competitive process inherently established
among them.3 1
B.

Other Issues

The majority and dissenting opinions raised a number of other
issues that are subordinate to the principal issue of aggression. Perhaps the most serious concerns that of the fact-finding competence
of the Court. Judge Schwebel argued that the Court had failed to
marshall all of the relevant facts.32 But, even with the facts that it
had, and even though facts were not provided by the United States
(apart from those included in the jurisdictional phase of the proceeding), the Court should have been aware that Nicaragua appeared with "unclean hands," that is as an aggressor.
In the context of United States practice, for example, the facts
by which a legislative body establishes law and the facts that are
acquired for the purposes of adjudication differ because the purposes of these two processes differ. The World Court is expected to
resolve "legal disputes," and except for competence ex aequo et
bono afforded by the parties themselves, the Court must invoke the
existing "law." The problem faced in a case concerning agression is
largely a constitutive question-a question concerning the allocation of and the structure for exercising power among states. Such a
question is comparable to that arising in the shaping of a constitution and establishing public order in that the issue of aggression
requires the consideration of when force may be legitimately exercised, who may exercise such force and what conditions should be
imposed on its exercise. No state perceives itself as the agressor
when it resorts to the use of force; rather, each insists that its actions are justifiable and even supported by community standards.
31. See also McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security, in M. MCDOUGAL. STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 763, 773
(1960) (footnote omitted):
Throughout the centuries of its development, one may observe the regime of the
high seas as not a static body of absolute rules but rather a living, growing, customary law, grounded in the claims, practices, and sanctioning expectations of nationstates, and changing as the demands and expectations of decision-makers are
changed by the exigencies of new social and economic interests, by the imperatives
of an ever-developing technology and by other continually evolving conditions in the
world arena.
32. See also Judge Oda's dissent on lack of sufficient means for the court to engage in
fact-finding. 1986 I.C.J. at 240-44 (Oda, J., dissenting).
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This inherently competitive element among states in the global process thwarts efforts to bring the use of force under control through
either law or other measures.
It is in this context that three distinguished scholars have used
the term "global war system" to describe the current system among
states in which recourse to military measures, measures largely
aimed at power and tending to favor coercion, dominates the actions among states:
In the contemporary world community where the expectation persists that differences may be resolved by violence or war, assessments of power are continuous and significant factors in behavior.
The interrelations of control and authority in the global community, as in its lesser component communities, are intimate. It
would, of course, be a gross misstatement to say that naked power
is the key variable . . . the ultima ratio. Wherever such power
operates.... it interstimulates with expectations of authority. But
it would be equally wrong to ignore naked power in any scholarly
inquiry or practical planning for decision making. Effective
power, made authoritative, is a ubiquitous aspect of all social
processes, an indispensable component of law.... The important
fact is that it is effective power, taken as a whole and commonly
comprised of both authority and control, that establishes and
maintains processes of authoritative decision, both constitutive
and public order, and hence affects the fundamental policies expresses in all law. 88
In addition to the overriding significance of power as the critical
element among states in their behavior, the fact-management process is one that must shape global order through a balancing process on a continuing basis, evidencing the principle of reciprocity in
claims, demands and tolerances. In any given situation among
states, including their conflicts or belligerency, activities or actions
can be singled out and identified as "legal disputes." But what must
be addressed, and where the Court must exercise self-restraint, is in
deciding which of these disputes are manageable under judicial
processes in both the international arenas and under the Charter,
and also in which disputes a decision that is based on "finality" and
limited enforcement possibilities will serve the fundamental objec33. McDougal, Reisman & Willard, The World Process of Effective Power: The
Global War System, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW 353 (M. McDougal & W.
Reisman eds. 1985). For information and analysis concerning constitutive and decision
processes, see generally the works of McDougal and his associates on world public order,
interpretation of treaties, outer space and the oceans.
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tives of global order under the Charter.
There is grave danger that a court even in good faith and with
good intentions can enter into "cases" and "controversies" in the
global arena in which its own integrity as an organ of authority and
control is at stake, in reality where its future authority is the critical issue. When this occurs, as in the Military Activities Case, a
court is in danger of becoming the instrument of the policy of the
winning side and no more.
Several issues raised by the Court and the dissenting judges
merit further analysis. The issue of jurisdiction, while not pursued
at length here, is important in that, as the United States sought to
demonstrate by its withdrawal, in the absence of all parties, including the states adjacent to Nicaragua who had suffered from the
aggression from Nicaragua, the Court's decision would be ineffectual. The Court's finding of jurisdiction, both in personae and as to
the subject-matter, was based on customary international law, but
was opposed in the dissenting opinions of Judges Schwebel, Jennings and Oda.
According to Judge Schwebel, the Court's assumption of jurisdiction with regard to embargoes against trade with Nicaragua
contrary to the Treaty of 1956 skirted the rights preserved by the
United States in Article XXI. Those rights included the adoption of
measures "necessary to fulfill the obligations of a Party for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or
necessary to protect its essential security interests. . . ."I" Judge
Schwebel observed that the Court simply ignored the relevant and

operative facts.
Finally, the Court's management of the use of force and of the
United States intervention should have been discussed primarily in
terms of aggression. The Court, however, set forth a confusing ar-

ray of observations and assumptions about this issue, finding, for
example, that the United States' obligations not to support the contras stems from the Geneva Conventions of 1949.3 5 The Court ar-

gued that those conventions contain "general principles of humanitarian law" and that such principles come from the general practice

of states. The Court concluded that the United States pursuant to
34. Military Activities Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 307 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
35. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 entered into force for the United States on
February 2, 1956. They are found, respectively, at 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S.
No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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Articles 1 and 3 of the four Geneva Conventions had an obligation
not to encourage persons in the Nicaraguan conflict to violate Article 3 principles. Apart from the weakness of this line of argument,
the analysis depended on an assumption that the United States was
the aggressor which, as Judge Schwebel noted, was not established
by the facts. In truth, the facts established Nicaragua as aggressor.
CONCLUSION

Even a brief preliminary assessment shows that the strategic implications of the opinion and the judicial process pursued by the
World Court in the Military Activities Case are far-reaching. The
Court faced an issue that called for invoking other decision-making
processes. The Court has always been vested with limited decisionmaking authority even with respect to the "legal disputes" that it
was anticipated would be heard. State actions already considered in
the cases submitted to the Court provide a growing practice establishing the expectations of states with respect to the reach of its
jurisdiction. States, in refusing to submit to such jurisdiction, have
added to its limitations.3 6 And the Court's authority is further limited by the judicial process and by states' expectations of courts'
assessments of global order processes that relate to constituting the
global order itself. Finally, there are severe limitations in the factfinding and fact-management capabilities of the Court so that it is
unable to come to grips with the realities of state conduct. More
specifically, the Court is unable to work in a dynamic power process where states are introducing an array of strategic and policy
instruments, claiming the legitimacy of their actions and aiming
these instruments not only at their own goals, but also at shaping
the global order itself.
Our long experience with the need to await developments of customary international law to take hold before resolving disputes is a
need that can be transferred to the problem that a court faces when
dealing with the strategies of states that resort to the use of force
during on-going hostilities. Moreover, due to the increased use of
force and violence among states since the Second World War, in
large measure thereby acquiring an expanding "legitimacy," a
court abstracted from the critical fora and processes for decision36. The United States' declaration and those of other states with respect to submittal
to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice are considered in 12 M.
supra note 1, at 1278-1351.
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making among states, and away from the decision process that relates to shaping global order, is thrust into arenas where judicial
management is not effective. It is faced with the need for self-restraint and the recognition that states are compelled to seek alternatives for their decision process. In the Military Activities Case,
the Court was faced with a demand by the United States to establish that Nicaragua had brought the wrong case in the wrong forum. The Court had no real choice but to reject jurisdiction. This it
failed to do. In turn, the United States had no choice but to with37
draw from the Court. This it did.

37. The arms control arena offers a useful model of how two states-the United States
and the Soviet Union-have introduced claims and counterclaims concerning violations of
treaty instruments relating to the control of weapons. The United States has claimed violations of the SALT and ABM agreements in the deployment of a major radar at Krasnoyarsk, the development and deployment of a new missile (SS-25), certain BACKFIRE improvements to give intercontinental operating capability and the encryption of ballistic missle
telemetry, as well as violations of the Helsinki Final Act concerning notification of military
exercises. On this subject, see generally, The President's Unclassified Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, White House Press Release,
Jan. 23, 1984 and Feb. 1, 1985; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control: U.S. Objectives, Negotiating. Efforts, Problems of Soviet Noncompliance. Washington,
USGRO, May 1984; id. as supplemented on Feb. 1, 1986; U.S. Congress, Senate Comm. on
Armed Services, Soviet Treaty Violations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984), as supplemented by
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); U. S. Dep't of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, GIST, Oct. 1985.
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